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Status of this Memo 
 
   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 
   all provisions of Section 10 of [RFC2026]. 
 
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 
   Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of 
   six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other 
   documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts 
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in 
   progress." 
 
   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 
 
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 




   The PKIX working group is profiling the use of X.509 attribute 
   certificates. This document specifies a deliberately limited 
   protocol for requesting an attribute certificate from a server. It 
   is intended to be complementary to the use of LDAP for AC retrieval, 
   covering, for example, those cases where use of an LDAP server is 
   not suitable due to the type of authorization model being employed. 
   For many other cases, the use of LDAP is preferred. 
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   <<Comments are in angle brackets like this.>> 
 
   The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" 
   in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 
 
   [ACPROF] specifies the Internet profile of the X.509 attribute 
   certificate (AC) for authorization purposes. This document specifies 
   a deliberately limited protocol for requesting such an AC from a 
   server. 
 
   There is clearly a requirement for an AC management protocol (or 
   protocols, like [CMP] and [CMC]). Such management protocols are not 
   specified in this document. There is also a requirement for a 
   specification of an LDAP schema to allow retrieval of ACs from LDAP 
   servers, which is specified in [LDAP-SCHEMA]. 
 
   In addition to such protocols, which may be more suited to 
   management of long-term or more sensitive (i.e. more "powerful") 
   ACs, there is a requirement for a very simple, explicitly limited AC 
   acquisition protocol. We call this protocol the Limited AC 
   Acquisition Protocol (LAAP). 
 
   LAAP consists of a simple request/response protocol encapsulated in 
   [CMP] messages. The entity which issues the request is called the 
   LAAP requestor (LRQ), the entity which issues the response is called 
   the LAAP responder (LRP). The LRQ is typically an AC holder or an AC 
   verifier; the LRP is typically the AC issuer itself. 
 
   The situations in which LAAP may be more suitable for use than LDAP 
   include: 
 
   - where ACs are very short lived and the latency involved in writing 
     to the LDAP servers is relatively long (e.g. if a complex 
     directory deployment is behind the LDAP server), 
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   - where a least privilege style of AC use is required, the LRP can 
     modulate the AC content based on the context of the LAAP request, 
     for example, if the LRQ is authenticated and the LRP is the AC 
     issuer, then the LRP may choose to include only the minimal set of 
     attributes (administered to be) required by that LRQ, 
   - where there are potentially numerous ACs, many of which are never 
     actually used during their lifetime (in which case they should 
     only be generated if needed) e.g. many entities have permission to 
     access some data, but only a subset of them actually do access it, 
   - where ACs contain encrypted attributes and it may not be possible 
     to search the LDAP directory for ACs with attributes of a specific 
     type. 
 
   LAAP is only intended to be used for cases where an LRQ wishes to 
   acquire a "current" AC for an entity (possibly itself) leaving 




   The LAAP protocol consists of two new message types which are 
   embedded in the PKI Message Body defined in [CMP]. One message (the 
   LAAP Request) is embedded in the GenMsgContent field, the other (the 
   LAAP Response) is embedded in the GenRepContent field. Future 
   specifications MAY enhance the request and/or response types defined 
   here - any such enhancement MUST use a different object identifier 
   to identify the GenMsgContent or GenRepContent. 
 
   The one and only feature of this protocol is to request an AC for a 
   particular entity that may be either the LRQ or some other entity. 
   The response is the requested AC or an error. 
 
2.1 Message Types 
 
2.1.1   LAAP Request Message 
 
   The request MAY specify the identity of the AC holder (for the third 
   party case), with an optional "profile". A profile is to be 
   interpreted as a bilaterally agreed string, or OID, that may be 
   mapped to a set of AC contents by the LRP. In the third party case, 
   the LRQ, MAY also include some evidence that the AC holder has 
   requested the LRQ to retrieve an AC belonging to the AC holder. 
 
      LACRequestMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
           holder    Holder OPTIONAL, 
           profile   [0] SEQUENCE { 
                string          UTF8String, 
                oid             OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
                } OPTIONAL, 
           issuer    [1] AttCertIssuer OPTIONAL, 
           acOptions ACOptions OPTIONAL 
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      ACOptions ::= BIT STRING { 
        attr-encryption (0), 
        proxying        (1), 
        object-digests  (2), 
        aa-controls     (3) 
      } 
 
   Each field is described below. 
 
   "holder": when present this specifies that the LRQ wishes to acquire 
   an AC for this holder. When absent, it means that the LRQ is 
   requesting an AC for itself (the LRP SHOULD use the identity 
   established from whatever authentication is available). The rules 
   for the holder field specified in [ACPROF] apply here (e.g. 
   constrained use of entityName). 
 
   "profile": when present this is signals that an AC matching the 
   supplied profile is returned. The definition of profiles is not in 
   scope for this specification and is expected to be a local matter. 
   There are two main uses envisaged for this field: 
 
   - Where an LRQ requests its own AC, then the profile field can be 
   used for those entities which require a non-default AC. The typical 
   case here is where a user requests her AC in order to "push" it to a 
   relying party via some protocol (like CMS). In most such cases, the 
   user can use a default AC whose content has been selected for her by 
   an administrator. Occasionally, such users will require a different 
   AC, perhaps for use in some application environment that is seldom 
   used. In such cases the profile field can contain a value provided 
   to the user by the AA administrator. It is often the case that a 
   profile maps well to a role in this scenario. 
 
   - When a relying party requests an AC for another entity it needs 
   the AC to contain a set of attributes which will enable the relying 
   party to make a "good" authorization decision. In most such cases, 
   the identity of the relying party will determine (for the AA) the 
   set of attribute types required. However, in cases where the 
   identity of the relying party is not known, or where a single 
   relying party makes "different" types of authorization decision, 
   (say where two applications run from a single account), then the 
   profile allows the relying party to specify which "type" of 
   authorization decision it wishes to make. It is often the case that 
   the profile maps well to an application or function in this 
   scenario. 
 
   Where it is desirable that the profile contain a globally unique 
   value, the profile SHOULD use the oid choice. Conformant 
   implementations MUST be able to handle both string and OID profiles. 
    One possible implementation model which can usefully use the OID 
   choice is for the profile to contain the OID of an LDAP or X.500 
   object class ([X.501], [RFC2526]) and for the LRP to produce an AC 
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   containing the relevant attribute values specified by that object 
   class. 
 
   Note that in all cases where a profile is specified by an LRQ, the 
   resulting AC may or may not meet the LRQ's expectation for ACs which 
   "match" the requested profile. The LRQ MUST check the resulting AC, 
   if it needs to check this "matching". Note also, that in addition to 
   selecting the "attributes" field, an LRP MAY also use the profile to 
   determine other AC fields, e.g. validity or extensions. 
 
   "issuer": This field allows the LRQ to specify the AC issuer in case 
   an LRP responds on behalf of more than one AC issuer. 
 
   "acOptions": This field allows the LRQ to indicate the set of the 
   optional features from [ACPROF] that the LRQ "supports". Each bit 
   may be set independently by the LRQ to indicate support for one of 
   the optional features. When this field is not present it should be 
   interpreted that all the bits are not set, which has the following 
   meaning: 
 
        Attribute encryption is not supported 
        Proxying is not supported 
        Object digests are not supported 
        AA controls are not supported 
 
   Note that if all the optional fields are missing, this means that 
   the minimal LAAP request structure consists of the octets ‘3000’H, 
   an empty ASN.1 sequence. This means "give me my current default AC 
   please and do not use any optional features from [ACPROF]". 
 
2.1.2   LAAP Response Message 
 
   The response message consists of an AC (errors are handled at the 
   CMP level). 
 
      LACResponseMessage ::= AttributeCertificate 
 
   When an LRQ receives an AC from an LRP it SHOULD verify the AC. In 
   addition the LRQ SHOULD ensure that the AC "matches" the LAAP 
   request issued, i.e. that the holder in the AC matches that in the 
   request (if present). Implementations may of course include 
   additional checks. 
 
   The AC in the response MUST conform to the profile specified in 
   [ACPROF] and MUST only make use of the optional features that the 
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2.2 Encapsulation in CMP 
 
   LAAP requests and responses are carried within a PKIMessage, as 
   defined in [CMP]. 
 
      PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
         header           PKIHeader, 
         body             PKIBody, 
         protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, 
         extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) 
                                OF Certificate OPTIONAL 
     } 
 
2.2.1   PKI Body 
 
   The GenMsgContent CHOICE of the PKIBody contains the LAAP request 
   and the GenRepContent contains the LAAP response. Each GenMsgContent 
   and GenRepContent consists of a SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue. 
   InfoTypeAndValue is an OID and an ANY defined by the OID. There 
   SHALL be only one InfoTypeAndValue for both LAAP requests and 
   responses. Separate OIDs are defined for LAAP requests and responses 
   as follows: 
 
      id-laap-req       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-laap 1 } 
      id-laap-rep       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-laap 2 } 
 
   The ANY field MUST be a LACRequestMessage for a LAAP request, and 
   the ANY field MUST be a LACResponseMessage for a LAAP response. 
 
   Errors are handled using the ErrorMsgContent form of PKIBody. 
 
   A conformant implementation is NOT REQUIRED to be able to handle any 
   other form of PKIBody. Of course, an LRQ or LRP MAY also handle 
   other forms of PKIBody, e.g. the mandatory profile specified in 
   [CMP]. 
 
2.2.2   PKI Header 
 
   The fields of the PKIHeader MUST be used as specified in section 
   3.1.1 of [CMP]. <<may need more specification here.>> 
 
        pvno        MUST be ietf-version 3 (2) [CMP2000] 
        sender      MUST adhere to the restrictions in [ACPROF]. 
                    Anonymous requests are allowed provider the holder 
                    field is present and MUST include an empty DN for 
                    the sender field. 
        recipient   MAY be empty DN. Only used for CMP message 
                    authentication (e.g. D-H cases) 
        generalInfo MUST be absent 
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2.2.3   PKI Protection 
 
   Though the PKIMessage construct supports the use of various forms of 
   authentication, the security required for a specific LAAP request or 
   response is not specified here. In order to provide a basic level of 
   interoperability LRPs MUST be able to handle requests authenticated 
   with either the PasswordBasedMac or signature methods described in 
   [CMP] section 3.1.3. LRPs MUST also be able to handle requests which 
   contain no PKIProtection (though they MAY always return an error). 
 
   LAAP requestors MUST implement one of PasswordBasedMac, signature or 
   missing. 
 
   Algorithms: the defaults are as in CMP. 
 
2.2.4   Additional Public Key Certificates 
 
   This field MAY contain a set of public key certificates that MAY be 
   used by the recipient to assist in verification of authentication of 
   the message sender or of an attribute certificate contained in a 
   response. 
 
   <<Is this the right conformance specification?>> 
 
2.3 Response Handling 
 
   If the LRP provides the AC that the LRQ requested, then a PKIStatus 
   of "granted" is returned. 
 
   If the LRP provides an AC that is not exactly what the LRQ requested 
   e.g. the AC grants some privileges but less than the LRQ requested, 
   then a PKIStatus of "grantedWithMods" is returned. It is a local 
   matter for the LRP to decide when to return granted and when to 
   return grantedWithMods. 
 
   If the LRP does not return an AC to the LRQ, then a PKIStatus of 
   "rejection" SHALL be returned. Section 2.5.4 describes the 
   PKIFailureInfo that MUST accompany this status message. 
 
   Other PKIStatus values MUST NOT be returned to the LRQ. 
 
2.4 Error Handling 
    If an LRP receives any CMP message which it does not support (e.g. a 
   public key certification request), then it MUST respond with an 
   error containing "rejection" as the PKIStatus, and "badRequest" as 
   the PKIFailureInfo. The status string MAY contain any implementation 
   specific value (though note that this field is intended to be human 
   readable). 
 
   For all other error conditions the PKIStatus MUST be "rejection". 
   If the LRP fails to authenticate the LRQ, or no or insufficient 
   authentication information was provided, and the LRP requires 
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   authentication, then a PKIFailureInfo of "badMessageCheck" SHALL be 
   returned. 
 
   If the LRP does authenticate the LRQ, but the the LRQ is not 
   authorised to receive the AC, then "notAuthorized" SHALL be 
   returned. 
 
   If the LRP detects an incorrectly formatted LACRequestMessage then a 
   PKIFailure of "badDataFormat" SHALL be returned. 
 
   If the LRP is unable to return an AC to the LRQ, then a PKIFailure 
   of "badCertId" SHALL be returned. 
 
   <<The semantics of this error code are correct and meaningful (i.e. 
   no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria). 
   However the label "badCertId" does not seem to be so correct, since 
   a certificate id was not provided by the LRQ. Therefore we could 
   either define a new PKIFailure code ("noCertFound") or we could ask 
   that the label in [CMP2000] be changed to "noCertFound", leaving the 
   semantics as now, or that [CMP2000] change the semantics of the 
   "badCertId" error to "incorrect certificate id provided and no 
   certificate could be found that matches it".>> 
 
   If the LRP suspects that the LRQ has contacted the wrong Attribute 
   Authority then a PKIFailure of "wrongAuthority" MAY be returned in 
   addition to "badCertId". 
 
   In addition to the above, the LRP MAY return a statusString for 
   human consumption. 
 
3. Transport Mechanisms 
 
   LAAP can be carried via a number of transport mechanisms: either 
   directly over TCP, or by encoding within HTTP. 
 
   Both LRQ and LRP implementations MUST support the TCP transport. 
   Either MAY support the HTTP transport. 
 
   [CMP] already defines TCP and HTTP transports. These MAY also be 
   used for LAAP. Some changes based on implementation experience have 
   been developed in [CMP-Tran]]. These changes supercede the 
   equivalent transports defined in [CMP] and MUST be supported by 
   compliant implementations. 
 
   LRQs and LRPs are NOT REQUIRED to support polling, as either an AC 
   or an error is expected to be produced immediately in response to a 
   request. This means that even if an LRP does support other forms of 
   [CMP] requests, it cannot use the polling mechanism in response to a 
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4. Security Considerations 
 
   The LRQ MUST verify the AC using the rules given in [ACPROF] before 
   making an authorization decision based on the AC. LAAP (like all 
   such protocols) is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, this 
   should be taken into account before deployment. If the LRP is the 
   actual AC issuer, then it should be very careful about handing out 
   ACs in response to unauthenticated requests. One model would be to 
   manage the authentication "strength" required before issuing a given 
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Full Copyright Statement 
 
   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date).  All Rights Reserved. 
 
   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published 
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any 
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph 
   are included on all such copies and derivative works.  In addition, 
   the ASN.1 module presented in Appendix B may be used in whole or in 
   part without inclusion of the copyright notice.  However, this 
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing 
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other 
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for 
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be 
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 
   English. 
 
   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be 
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.  This 
   document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS 
   IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK 
   FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT 
   NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN 
   WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 
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Appendix A: Object Identifiers 
 
   This section lists the object identifiers defined in this 
   specification. 
 
   The following object identifiers are inherited from [RFC2459] and 
   [CMP]. 
 
   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
                dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } 
      id-mod  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 0 } 
      id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 4 } 
 
   The following new ASN.1 module identifier is defined: 
 
      id-mod-laap       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-mod <<tbs>> } 
      << probably { id-mod 13 }>> 
 
   The LAAP message types are defined as follows: 
 
      id-laap           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it <<tbs>> } 
      << probably { id-it 7 } >> 
      id-laap-req       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-laap 1 } 
      id-laap-rep       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-laap 2 } 
 
   Note: The following OID has been assigned that may be used during 
   testing until an official pkix oid is assigned 
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Appendix B: "Compilable" ASN.1 module 
 
   PKIXLaap {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 
             internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 
             -- temporary, still tbs -- id-mod-laap(13)} 
 
   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 
   BEGIN 
   -- EXPORTS ALL -- 
 
   IMPORTS 
 
      Holder, AttCertIssuer, AttributeCertificate 
        FROM 
         PKIXAttributeCertificate {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
                     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) 
                     pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert(12)} 
 
      id-pkix 
        FROM 
          PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
                     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) 
                     pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)} ; 
 
       -- this is referenced, but not defined in [CMP] 
      id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 4 } 
 
      id-laap           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 
                            { id-it -- temporary, still tbs -- 7 } 
 
      -- these OIDs are used as the infoType of the 
      -- GenMsgContent and GenRepContent PKIBody fields respectively 
      id-laap-req       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-laap 1 } 
      id-laap-rep       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-laap 2 } 
 
      LACRequestMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
           holder    Holder OPTIONAL, 
           profile   [0] SEQUENCE { 
                string          UTF8String, 
                oid             OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
                } OPTIONAL, 
           issuer    [1] AttCertIssuer OPTIONAL, 
           acOptions ACOptions OPTIONAL 
      } 
      ACOptions ::= BIT STRING { 
           attr-encryption      (0), 
           proxying             (1), 
           object-digests       (2), 
           aa-controls          (3) 
      } 
      LACResponseMessage ::= AttributeCertificate 
 
   END 
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Appendix C: Changes this version / Open Issues 
 
   Changes for version 02: 
 
   1.  Synchronized with latest [ACPROF] 
   2.  Added GenRepContent for LAAP response 
   3.  Added sections on response handling and error codes 
   4.  Added provisional OIDs 
   5.  Decided not to use UDP transport. 
  
   Changes for version 01: 
  
   1.  Synchronized with latest [ACPROF] 
   2.  Samples to separate draft (same as [ACPROF]) 
   3.  Removed UDP transport requirement 
   4.  Changed profile from UTF8 to optional OID and/or UTF8 
   5.  Removed holderAuth feature 
   6.  Added "supported options" indicator to request 
  
   Changes for version 00: 
  
   1.  This is the first issue, previously LAAP was specified as part 
       of the AC profile [ACPROF] 
   2.  Changed LAAP so its now encapsulated in [CMP] 
   3.  Added more definition of profile field 
   4.  Added holderAuth field (probably temporarily) 
   5.  Added requirement for UDP transport 
   6.  Added compiled ASN.1 module 
  
   Open issues: 
  
   1.  Register new pkix OIDs 
   2.  What level of authentication to mandate (if any) 
   3.  "badCertID" error code semantics and label to be resolved 
   4.  Are details of CMP encapsulation correct, esp. for 2000 
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